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ABSTRACT
THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES A NRW METHOD OF RELIABILITY PREDICTION FOR
( OC_LEX SYST_. THE METHQD INVOLVES CAILKILATIONOF BOTH UPPER AND
LOWER BCETNDS,AND A PROCEDURE FOR CCMBINING THE TWO TO YIELD AN
APPROXIMATELY TEUE PREDICTION VALUE. BCTH MISSION SUCCESS AND CREW
SAFETY PREDICTIONS CAN BE CAIEUIAT_, AND SUCCESS PROBABILITIES CAN
BE OBTAINED FOR INDIVIDUAL MISSION PHASES OR SUBSYS_. PRIMARY
CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO EVALUATING CASES INVOLVING ZERO OR ONE
FAI_'IREPER SUBSYSTem, AND THE RESULTS OF THESE EVALUATIONS ARE THEN
USED FOR ANALYZING MULTIPLE FAILURE CASES. EXTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT IS
PROVIDED FOR THE OVERALL MISSION SUCOESS AND CREWSAFETY EQUATIONS
FOR BOI_ THE UPPER AND LOWER BCD-NDS. SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF
INDIVIDUAL PHASE AND SUBSYSTEM EQUATIONS IS GIVEN SO THAT THEIR
DEVIATIONS _ BE DETERMINED EASILY BY TKE READER.
FOLLOWING THE MAIN BODY OF THE REPORT, A SHORT APPENDIX IS PROVIDED
WHICH DELINEATES THE SPECIFIC DATA REQUIRED FROM THE RELIABILITY
ANALYSTS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE METHOD WAS TO SIMPLIFY THE DATA
REQUIREMENTS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, AND TO INCLUDE THE RESULTING
CCMPLEXITY IN THE PREDICTION METHOD ITSELF.
A C_ER PROGRAM WAS DEVELOPED TO PF_0RM THE CAILRTfATIONS
INDICATED BY THE EQUATIONS. TO 0P_IMIZE COMPUTER UTILIZATION, THE
PROGRAM DEVIATES FROM THE TEXT WITH RESPECT TO TEE SEQUENCE OF THE
MATHEMATICAL OPERATIONS. AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAM IS A
SECOND APPENDIX TO THIS REPORT. A SAMPLE OF THE OOMPLITER
0UTPUT IS A THIRD APPENDIX.
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RELIABILITY PREDICTION METHODS FOR THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT
SUMMARY
The complexity of the Apollo Spacecraft and missions has necessitated
a reevaluation of methods for prediction of reliability. It has been found that
exact analytical methods are either difficult to define or so detailed or com-
plex that they cannot readilybe used. Some degree of success in performing
predictions has been achieved through the use of simulation models (Monte ,
Carlo techniques). However, these have proved excessively expensive,
particularly when very high overall reliabilities are involved. This is !
because the degree of accuracy is dependent on the number of simulation
trials, and a greater number of trials is required for the same degree of
accuracy for high reliabilitiesthan for lower reliabilities.
As a result of these limitations, attempts have been made to calculate !
reliability prediction numerics by using approximate analytical methods, j
Some of these approximate methods involve calculation of only a lower
bound, and provide sufficient proof that the true prediction number is higher
than the calculated number. How much higher, however, has been difficult
to determine, even approximately. The original method used by S&ID over-
came this difficulty by calculating both an upper and a lower bound and, by
an empirical method, computing an approximately true value. The upper
bound was found by subtracting failure cases from unity, while the lower
bound was found by adding success cases. All calculationswere performed
using desk calculators and manual methods, with the resulting limitation
that only simple success and failure cases could be considered. This led
to considerable differentialbetween the two bounds. An important advantage,
however, was the abilityto detect inconsistencies and anomalies in the input
data and secure rapid correction.
Since development of the p_'evious approximate analytical method, t
further expansion of the techniques has been made so that ell cases can be
I
considered. This was made possible through thorough evaluation of both
the original input and output numerics and determination of error magnitudes
that could result from the approximations necessary for considering cases
involving multiple failures. More exact calculations are used for zero md
one-failure cases, resulting in consideration of a higher percentage of the
totalnumber of cases. The number of multiple-failure cases is thereby
reduced to a level where the simplificationsused would not significantly
affectthe overall results. The modifications, greater exactness, and
expanded number of cases led to utilizationof a computer program to
perform the numerical operations, while stillpermitting visual (manual)
O0000001-TSBIO
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_val.u.tion of inl)ut data. Tim current methods apply to calculation of crew
s;_fety proh:lbility ;ind also provide for determination of mission and craw
loss probabilitic,_ by individual subsystem or phase. The computer per-
forms e_enti;tlly the same calculations dt_scribad hare, although the order
is sometimes v;tried to facili(ate optimum conlpuler utilization.
MISSION SUCCESS - UPPER BOUND
The uplmr bound of the reliabilityprediction range for mission sue-
cess is found by considering failurosand, in effect, subtracting theso from
t_nity. Only series elements in the mission ,:ontinuationlogic diagrams are
considered. Mission success occurs when no series element failsin any
subsystem in any phase ufthe mission_that is, the probability of mission
success is the product of the reliabilitiesof all series elements. Element
reliabilitiesare firstcombined into subsystem reliabilitiesfrom which the
mission success probability is calculated.
_=m
i=n
RMS = 1"I R.x,j
i=l
j=l
where
RMS is the probabilityof mission success;
Ri, j is the reliabilityof subsystem i in phase j;
m is the number of phases; and
n is the number of subsystems
An exponential model (constant failure-ratesystem) is assumed except
for single-shot components. This approach is realisticbecause components
are pretested and then operated within their normal useful life. Italso
facilitatescalculationsby making possible the suitable combination of
reliabilitiesof various components. The exponential model is also used
in all other predictions discussed in this report.
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Since R. = e whoru F is th,.: l';kill'rc pr-|mbility of nulJsy._t,.=,l
i in ph;_sej,t,j _,j
Jrl
n *F l -F_ oi,' -I,' -I,' -I,"
, I ,I n, 1 l,,_' n," n,if,II R. _ n ×o X.. _' :Kc ×. c X. ,:
i= ]
j=l
"(I"1,1 + i"Z, 1 + "''F + F 1 t .1' , _ ...I.' )llt | p ,_, ' II_ llp ll)
II
i- l t, j
ej=l
or RMS = . (1)
MISSION SUCCESS - LONER BOUND
_ihe lower bound for probability of mission success is found by adding
success cases. It can be easily shown that for Apollo mission phases, when
three or more possible paths exist, the resultant failure prob;,bilityof the
redundant components is less than l x I0"6 in all cases of current configura-
tions. Therefore failureprobabilitiesof components in such parallel paths
are pot included in the computation. All other components are included.
The success cases considered are those in which no failureoccurs in
any included component and those in which not more than one non-series
..omponent fails. Assuming the following simple logic diagram for one
subsystem in one phase -
the probability of mission success is found by adding the probability of no
failure of any component (A through F) to the sum of the probabilities of
a failure of any one non-serles component (C through F), the other com-
ponents not failing.
- 5-
O0000001-TSB12
JR.t,j = (R A',_ R B× R cx RDX REX RF)
a
+ (R AX R BX Qcx R Dx REx RF)
+ (R AX R Bx R C XQDX REx RF)
t{_ x R xR XR xQ x
A...... B C D E RF)
{R x R""_- xR x R QF)
'_ A B i_'c-...._, z x
Ri, j = (R AX RB X R C X R D x R E X R F) .... "" ......._"_ .........--:.:,_._.:........:......
(_A×%" %" RD"_z "%"+ Rc/
+ A x RB× RC× QDX REX RF x
+ A × RBX R Cx R DX QEX R FX
+ AXRBX RcX RDX RE× QF×
= {RAx RBx Rcx RDx Rzx R_)
Q('_C QD QE Q_'F)+_RA×RB×Rc×R_,×RE×%_,, +_ +_ +
k=A J J + II Rk i _ .'k=A ' j Rki, j/ ..
r /1 Q_..\ "
k=A i,j/
- 4 -
. SID 66-744 f_
00000001-TSC01
, NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. I i+)), Hl'Avl,;and INI_'_)ILMA'I'I¢_N H¥_TI,:MH DIVlHION
where
is the reliability of component k of
Rki* J subsystem i in phase j;
is the probability of failure of a non-series
Ql_i' J component of subsystem i in phase j; and
Rl_i, j is the reliability of the non-series component.
"Qki' J is the probability of failure of any includedSince Rki ' j = e where Qki ' J
component in subsystem i in phase j;
_,i R. -e +:;3.,j Rki ' j/
However, Rl_i, j is frequently very close to unity for any one phase, and may
then be omitted from the calculations giving the r_._ult:
)a. .-e J 1+ (z)1, j X;--ki, j
Equation 2 is referenced later in this report, and its derivation is
•important to the analyses. When RI_ is greater than 0. 999, as is almost
always true, Equation Z is exact. The equation facilitates the rapid sum-
mation of individual component failure probabilities with minimum calculat-
ing time. (When RI_ is less than O.999, it is used in the calculation of
. Equation 2. Equation Z, as shown, will be used in this report, remembering
that i%1_is considered in the calculations, when appropriate. }
" The subsystem-phase reliabilities are combined to obtain the overall
mission success probability. Only one non-series failure per subsystem is
considered, although any number of subsystems may have a failed component.
' The following notations are used for simplification:
i Fi' j = X"Qki, J and Fi, j = 2;Ql_i, j
-5-
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Equation 2 thus becomes:
-F,
Ri, l=_ _'lll+bi, j) (a)
The probability of no failures in subsystem i in phase j is.
"Fi, j (4)
and the probability of exactly one non-series failure is:
-F.
x, j
e x $'. (s)1, j
NOTE: In the lower bound case calculations,
F includes both series and parallel
components.
Since only one failure per subsystem is considered in the mission,
the reliability of a subsystem is calculated by summing the probability of
zero failures and all cases of the probability of one non-series failure.
-F. -F. -F. -F.
R. = e i, l X e 1, Z I,3 i,mXe X ..... •ei
-Fi, i,m
+ 1 X_. X e 1,2Xe 1,3 X..e
1,
-F. (e -F. 2) -F. -F.
_,1 i,2 I,3 I,m
+e X X_. X e X..e
l,
6 • • • • •
I, 1 I, 2 l, 3 i,m •
+ e X e X e X .. e xFi, m
"": e Xe 1'ZXe X .... e
"" -"l,2 I,3 i, • .
e X e X .... e X (_ri,1+ Fi,2+ Fi,3+....F':,m)
- 6 -
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i, -(Fi, l+Fi, z+Fij 3+ .... F._, m )
_'ii R.--e_.
I.
+ e l+Fi' 2+Fi' 3+ .... F. m} . Fi,
"(Fi, ,, × (Fi,1 + _r.1,2 + 3 +. ... _r.z,m)
m m m
"J_lFi, J o-* _,J
: e + e - e + ._, F. (6)
¢
NOTE: To simplify calculations, the original
_} phase logic diagram associated with
! each phase is retained although itis• recognized that a failure of a non-
series element in one phase slightly
" modifies the logic diagrams for suc-
_., ceeding phases. This az)proach is
_" conservative because actually fewer
components need be considered in
phases subsequent to the failure.
The reliabilityof the system is the product of the reliabilitiesof all
individual subsystems (from Eq.uation6):
[°= ( )I :-%'") G )n n 3_iFi, j m . _ _,e J= j X igln + m_ "RK_S: l'I Ri-- l-[ 1+ Z F.. =i=l i=1 j=l x,j i=1 j=IFi, j
IFz'J IFn' ><i_l 1 + j= i,j= e _--zl_l'jxe X...e xl_
n m
m.
=J i_IJ_lFi'j '_i%(I .--,1F£,j) (7)J=
J
' A small increment of mission success, ARMs , is added to Equation 7.
This is obtained from Equation 35.
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It has been found empirically that an approximatei / true value of the
failure probability can be obtained by taking the square root of the product
of the upper and lower values of the probability of failure. From this, it
follows that
= - - ×(I- RMS )RMS I V/(I RMS)upper lower
(s)
" i=_lFi, n m
• ' m •
(fromEq. 11 (from Eq. 71 (from
Zq. 3s)
NOTE: F in RMS considers only series components;
upper
F in R MS considers both series and parallel components.
lower
CREW SAFETY - UPPER BOUND
The upper bound for crew safety is the sum of the probabilities of
mission success (MS) and all possible safe aborts (SA) resulting from the
failure of a series component.
RCS --RMS + RSA (9) '! •
As in the case of the mission success upper bound, itis actually found by
considering failures and the probabilities of their not occurring.
The probability of a safe abort is the product of the probability that
an abort is required times the probability that it is successful. As a very
close approximation, an abort is considered to take place at an average time
of half way through the phase in which it is necessitated. (The greater the
number of phases and the shorter each phase, the closer the approximation. }
- 8 -
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Each abort case is calculated as a mutually exclusive event, thereby
•permitting the simple addition of all abort cases considered. An abort case
is computed by taking the product of the following terms:
a. The probability of mission continuation(MC) for all subsystems
up to the phase in which the abort occurs, (no series failures).
b. The probability that all subsystems except the one that failed
perform satisfactorily for an average time of one-half of the phase
in which an abort is required.
c. The probability that, in the phase, the subsystem under consider-
ation incurs a failurethat requires but does not preclude an
abortmi, e., failure of a component that is in series in the MC
" logic diagram but is not in series in the SA logic diagram.
. d. The probability that all subsystems except the one that failed
perform satisfactorily during the abort_i, e., no failure of a
series component in the normal abort logic diagram.
e. The probability that the failed subsystem performs satisfactorily
during the abort_that is, incurs no failure of a series element
in the modified abort logic diagram. The series elements in the
modified diagram include the original series components plus the
average number of additional components which become series
elements as a result of the failure which occurred in the mission.
The terms a through e are found as follows:
a. Reliability of all subsystems up to phase of abort
phase-1
n
_1 Fi, j
phase-ll_, e j=l (10)
= ,-,e-nRi,j =
" j=l
Derivation of this equation is the same as that for Equation I.
-9-
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b. Probability that all other subsystems perform for one-half of
abort phase
phase - _-
phase - _- i_=_lRi, j
n-! _=phase -1
= , •i_I1Ri'j = lj=pnase - 1 phase - _
Rn, j
j=phase - 1
-_ _F.. i_l l,j Xe n,j
e i= I *' J e
= j=abort phase = j=abort phase (11)
n, j
e
c. Probability that subsystem n fails ha phase j
1
. F / " X Fn, j ,= R × = e x F (IZ)
n, J n, j j=abort pha_' j
Derivation of this equation is similar to that for-Equations Z and
5, except that F n represents failures of subsystem n that require
but do not preclude an abort, and the average time of abort is
half way through the phase.
d. Probability that all other subsystems perform satisfactorilyin
abort
B
i=_?i, J, abort
"h?LRi, == j, abort R
n, j, abort
- 10- _
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e "i_IGi' J e "i_IGi' J xo+Gn' j
=. =
e"Gn,J
where Gi, j is the failur_ probability of subsystem i in abort in
phase j.
e. Probability that subsystem n performs satisfactorily
• / • / , , ,
in abort = Rn, j,abort = e'Gn, j where Gn, j ts the modlfmd
failure probability of subsystem n, (-Gn, j + AGn, j}. Therefore,
-(Gn,j + j)
, n, (14)R =e
n, j, abort
Equations 10 through 14 are multiplied together to obtain the proba-
bility of safe abort of one subsystem in one phase.
{ -i=_lFi' x e'_i_--IFi'J x e+IFn' x (e./'lFn'Jx ]_"'n,j)RSAn, j j=abort phase \ j=abort phase
+G G + _G )
n, nj n, jX J X e X
phase- 1
n n n
-½._,F. Z G.
"i=ZIFi, j z=, z,j "i=1 x,j
-_G
n,j
= e j=l x e x F" x e x e (15)
n,j
When the abort is caused by failure of the Service Propulsion System
(SPS) in the mission, another abort method may be used, depending on the
mission. This may result in a changed abort logic diagram for the Service
Module Reaction Control System (S/M RCS) and, in some cases, for other i
• subsystems. A new probability of failure in abort, GGi, j, is substituted
for G_ 4 for the affected subsystems, where applicable, thus modifying
Equa{{oJns 13 and 15. This is done before summing RSAi, j.
- 11 -
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The t-tal number of safe aburts is the sum of the RSAi, j terms:
i
m
n
RSA = i_l' RSA i'j (from Equation l q or modified 15} (161
The overall upper bound for cruw safety is the sum of Equations 1 and 16:
RCSuppe r = RMSuppe r + RSAuppe r 19)
CREW SAFETY--LOWER BOUND
The most complex case is the Lower-bound prediction of crew safety.
The major reason for this complexity is the inability to account analytically
for cases of multiple failures. Although analytical models and computer
programs have been developed to evaluate multiple failures occurring in
one phase, the failure probabilities cannot be evaluated when they occur in
different phases, which is many times more likely. Consequently, an
at_alytical method has been developed which provides a very close approxi-
mation to the true answer, and which can be shown to be on the conservative
side, thereby providing a lower bound. +
The lower bound for crew safety is found by adding the probability of
mission success, all cases of the probability of safe abort with no more
than one failureper subsystem in the mission and in the abort, and all
other cases of safe abort. The firsttwo of these probabilitiesare computed
directly;the third utilizesa method of differences discussed in succeeding
pa ragraphs.
The probability of mission success is obtained from Equation 7. The
probability of safe abort with no more than one failure per subsystem is
calculated as the product of several probabilities. However, there is more
complexity in these calculations than for the upper bound b_cause, £or the
lower bound, both series and parallel components are considered, and each
subsystem may have one nonseries failurein either MC or SA or both.
(The system which necessitated the abort has a noncatastrophic series
failure in MC. ) The failurepermitted during abort depends on the condition
of the system when the abort is started.
The probability of zero or one failureup to the time of abort is cal-
culated from a modification of Equation 7. Equation 7 defines the reliability
for all subsystems for all phases. This is modified by summing the number
of phases from phase one to half-way through the phase in which the abort
-IZ-
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occurs, (pka_o - I/Z). Th_ sum of f. iluro prubabilitius from phase o|m
through (phase - l/Z) can moru e;_nil_, bu expren._ed an the sum from phase
one through {phase -1) plus tmu-h.lf thu failure probability for tt.._ phase:
j=abort pha sa-_- phase-!
j_lFi,j - J_XlF''_'J+ _ _i,j
j=abort phase
Since the abort is caused by the failure of a series component in one
subsystem, the changed equation is further modified by dividing by the
reliability of the subsystem which failed reference Equation l I. The
resulting expression is:
n /phase-I \
e i=l j=l j=abort x i=II1 1 + j_l#i,j + _,Fi, jpnase
j=abort
phase ( 17)
_ + _Fn,j , ,j=l n,j phase-I
e j:abort × + X F_ -+ _j:l ",J ",J/
phase j=abort"
phase
Subsystem n, which incurred a noncatastrophic series failure in the
mission, had no failure up to the abort phase and no other failure in the
• phare. From Equations 10 (modified) and 1g, this probability is expressed
as:
phase-1
:. j / .X
e _e n'Jx F I ._ (18)• n,J/
- j=abort pnase
In this set of cases, each subsystem except the one which had the
Series failure can achieve a successful abort if not more than one non-
series failure occurs in the abort. (A nonseries failure in MC does not
- 13 -
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g-.m'r_llly ;lit'cot th,: ,0b_rt bec;,u,_e ,l l_;iraIlt:[ cleanest h_ MC is at le;int
triply redundant in the abort I.gic.) Therefore. the pr_ability of success
_d' times aub_yntcz_lu in abort is expressed by:
.-1 n
" _: Gi, j " _ Gi,j n
i: 1 n- 1 e i= 1 I1 (1 + Gi,j)
e j:abort phase × lI (1 + Gi,j) = i= 1 (19)
i--I ×(] +6 ,j)
Wh_: rt_
G. , in the failure probabitity in abort il_ phase j of any included
J't_
c.mponent uf subsystem i (series or dual-parallel components)$
t
G, . is the fiiilure probability in abort in phase j of a non-sorlea
t,3 component of subsy,'tem i;
G . is the failurt; probability in the abort of an included component
n,jof subsystem n which fail_d in the mission;
. is the failure probability in the "abort of a non-series component
n,j of subsystem n.
Subsystem n, which had a noncatastrophic faiture in the mission, has
a modified abort logic. This includes the original components less one or
more parallel components no longer applicable due to the mission failure.
The probability of a successful abort is the sum of the probabilities of.no
failure, e'Gn,j, and of not morethan one non-series failure (e'Gn,j x Gn,j).
Gn, j is equal to Gn, j - _.Gn, i where -AGn, _ accounts for the reduced proba-
bility. Gn,j is equal to Gn,; - 2AGn, j because not only are one or more
components no longer applicable, but their counterparts are no longer in
parallel. Thus, the probability of subsystem n successfully completing
the abort is:
-(O
e n,j n'J) × (] + (_n,j " Z'AGn,j) (20)
:f
I_:[I
The probability of safe abort for the cases of not more than one failure ;/
per subsystem in the mission, for one subsystem in one phase, is found by :
taking the products of Equations 17 through _0:
- 1,1 -
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-c / ( )n phi c- ] i- _ '_ Fi,j + _ri,j fi ,,h,,_,..-I .i=l\ j=l j=abort'X 1+ Z I:' "1-_1,'..i_ phase i.:l j=l i,j i,J ph;Ise-I
j'::;,bort - 2 I_i,j . I
,,h,,_ :< j=_ t<_.,,;,.j,<)I
'_".,j= 0'_""°-' ) j_,,,...!."[
e - j=anort x I + j_l Fn,j + __'n,jph;ise j=abort
l:dlase
. n
i_ia_'j i_1 "a j=abort x '= (l + Gi,j)
phase
x e.On,j _'. × [°'(Gn'J'AGn'jij=aburtphase x (i + dn, j - /_aGil,jl[
x 11 + G nj=abort ,J)
phase
n'pha,o=,) ( )" _ It _lr i,j +xFi,j n i>h,,se-1i]J 1'_'i'J ti=l j x 1 + .'-:. _'_ _ +.,
= e 1 _=1 ,a x Fn, j
(zl)
i'i
" _ Gi,j n
i-1 _id)
e x i=rl1 (1 + e+_Gn, j . ZAGn,j )X X X (1 + dn, j
(1 + tin,j)
The probability of safe abort for these cases for all subsystems and all
( mnphases is the sum of all RSAi, j, RSA = N RSA. :i= 1 z, J]j=l /
15-
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' / ( )m phase-I ,i=lk J_lFi'j + IFi,j _ 1 + j_lfi.j + _Fi,
i__ x i=lj=l I+ + "_'_'n,
n 1"i_lGi,j ne - xi=III{I+ 6id)x F* x X efAOn,J X (I + Gn,j "ZAGn,j (ZZ)nd {1+ Gn,j}
As in the upper bound case, failure of the SPS in the mlss_.on may
cause a changed abort mode, and result in changes in the abort logic proba-
bilities for affected subsystems. These are appropriately incorporated into
Equations 19, Z1, and ZZ.
The final group of cases--safe abort with more than one failure in the
mission in one or more subsystems--utilizes a method of differences.
Several probabilities are considered. The sum of these probabilitiesis
equal to the probability of getting to a phase so that, ifany one probability
is unknown, it can be found by taking the difference between the probability
of getting to the phase and the sum of the other probabilities. This fact is
used to evaluate cases of multiple failures and, ultimately, Crew safety.
The probabilities that are summed are:
I. The probability of catastrophic failure;
2. The probability of mission continuation;
3. The probability of an abort with no more than one failureper
subsystem. .,
These are then subtracted from the probability of gettingto the phase, and
all remaining cases are considered to be attempted aborts.
I. Because the lower bound of crew safety is being computed, calcu-
lation of catastrophic failures is performed so as to yield a probability that
is on the high side rather than the low side. The overall probability of a
catastrophic failure in any phase is a function of the probability of getting to
the phase and the probability that a catastrophic failure occurs in the phase.
Since a catastrophic failure is the failure of a component that is in series in
- 16 -
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both the MC and SA logic diagrams, the probability that a catastrophic fail.re
,occurs in a phase is the same for both the upper and lower cases. The vari-
able involved is the difference in the probability of getting to the phase. A
higher probability of getting to a phase will result in a greater number of
catastrophic failures in the phase. Therefore, when calculating catastrophic
failures for the crew safety lower bound, the probability of getting to a phase
is obtained from the upper bound MC model. This is found by using
Equation 10.
Since the catastrophic failure occurs in one subsystem and at an average
time of one-half way through a phase, the other subsystems are satisfactory
for this period of time. The probability of these subsystems being good is
obtained from Equation 1 1.
: Finally, the probability of a catastrophic failure is found by modifying
Equation lZ to include the probability of a catastrophic failure instead of a
noncatastrophic one.
Probability of a catastrophic failure equals
L
.I F
2 n,j
(Fn,j - F .) (Z3)e n,_
j=abort phase
The overall probability of a catastrophic failure for one subsystem (n) in
one phase is the product of Equations I0, 1I, and Z3:
phase-I
PCFn, j = e j=l /× \eJ=abort × e+½Fn, j × [e-½rn,j (rn, j_ rn,j)]
phase
phase-1
n n
-_:F.. t
i=l 1,J "gi_iFi,j
= e j=l x e X (Fn,j - Fn,j) (Z4} i
The total probability of catastrophic failure of all subsystems in one phase
is the sum of the individual subsystem probabilities.
i
!
i
_J
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i! .i_lFi,j . _. _. Fi' .
- i=l ,o . F, I
= _ j--.l ×e x IFi,j i,jPcFj _l "[
I! phase-1. n rl
j=l n
=e xe x _:(_" -F',j) (ZS)i= 1 i ,j i
_' Z. Since the crew safety lower bound is found by summing success
cases, conservative values of mission continuation utilize lower bound¢
_! mission success probability calculations. Equation 7 is modified by
appropriately changing the limits of the summation.
n phase
- z _ r.,, / phase.
i=l j=l :"J fi
RMC j = e X tl + Z Fi,j} (Z6)i= 1 j=I /
I o .,
3. The probability of an abort in a phase with no more than one fail-
;! ure per subsystem is found by summing the products of Equations 17 and 18
I_ for all subsystems. This is comparable to summing the terms of Equa-
l tion 21 after deleting those terrrs concerned with probabilitiesof successful
I abort.
- [ Z; Fi_+g i,j n phase-I
__1 \ j=l a x + _9i, jI, = i=l ,
i Pabort,j (I phaserl ) '
Fk,j (Z7)
I', j_iFk,j+ ½_'k,j
The probability of remaining abort cases per phase is found by sub-
tracting Equations Z5, Z6, and Z7 from the probability of getting to the
phase (Equation 7 modified). Remaining abort cases j.
n phase-I
i= 1 j= 1 l, j n phase -1
= e x H + _ _'. - (z + + 1281
i= 1 j= 1 x, j 5)j (Z7)j
- 18-
SID 66-744
00000001-TSD03
!' I i' '_,_ ! Hl_Al'Eavkd INl,'(bltlklA'i'|_)_ _YMl'll-:Mt=l IYI%'IHI¢|N
!! _IORTH AMERICAN AVIATION. INC. ,,
: The question arises as to whether some of these remaining cases
might be mission continuation cases rather than abort cases because, if
they are MC cases, there will be some additional probability of a catastrophic
, failure in a later phase. However, the probability of catastrophic failure is
already based on maximum probability of mission continuation (Equation 25)
and includes all possiblecases Of catastrophic failure. Therefore, for
crew safety calculations, it is correct to treat all remaining cases as abort
cases.
The probability of achieving a successful abort is, of course, a function
of the configuration of the system when the abort is initiated. Since it is not
feasible to separate the remaining cases into groups according to which
subsystem failure necessitates the abort (because of the complexity resulting
from multiple failures), it is necessary to empirically determine an average
abort logic applicable to all subsystems which will be conservative, yet not
so conservative as to result in an unrealistic number of abort failures.
_'_ Two approaches are possible. The first approach is to determine a
: simple series configuration for each subsystem. This, however, is overly
Ii conservative because most subsystems will stillhave parallel capability.
!:i The second approach, used here, is to assume an average of two
il failures per subsystem in the mission and appropriately modify each sub-
: system abort logic. It can be shown that this is very conservative because
most subsystems will have incurred less than two failures, and many will
have no failures. The Poisson distribution--which applies to conditions
in which there are many opportunities for failure but only a small probability
of failure at any one opportunity, a typiCal situation for spacecraft--is
utilized. The probabilities of zero and one failure in a subsystem are found,
and the appropriate Poisson values are determined. From these, the typical
_ average number of failures per subsystem is well below 1.0 and never above
_ 2.0. Therefore, the probability of successful abort for one subsystem in
one phase (Rs_i,___j} is found by modifying Equation 20 to take into account
two mission failures. This modification is, in itself, conservative because
it accounts for noncatastrophic mission failures which have the greatest
effect on safe abort probability.
_i R ^ = Abort prob.. = e x (I + G. - 4AG. j) (29): SA. 1, j 1, j l,
:, l,j
i''
i'
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The number of such safe aborts per phase is found by multiplying the
number of remaining abort cases in the phase (Equation 28) by the probability'
n
of all subsystems being successful, {ill I Equation 29).
l npha'°' i)I t- _ _ F. n phase.1 ni:l j=l "J × + ×inl(zg)= e - (zs)j+(z6)j+(z7)j .=RSAAj 130_
The total number of such safe aborts is obtained by summing the
number for all phases (z) in which an abort is possible.
Z z
= E RSAj = Z (30) (31)RSAA j:1 j:l
In addition to these aborts, the remaining cases which occur during the
final mission phases (return, reentry, and post landing) must be considered.
The number of these cases is found from Equation 28 in the same manner
as for other phases except that Equation 27 is deleted (its value is zero).
The probability of a successful abort, however, cannot be obtained from
Equation 29 because there are no separate abort configurations for these
phases. To find this probability, the mission success probability for the
remaining mission phases, starting half-way through the phase being considered,
is determined. This is found from Equations 7 and 26.
n rn
i=l j=l x,j _,.e x I+ _
i=l ;_=1 x, JR RMS
e i= 1 j= 1 i, j n phase-_
×H + =zi=l j IFi, j
- _: _ .½Fi, Ji_! l+j Fi, jif 1 j=phase
=e X
')n (i phase-gi=II i- _ "jffil Fi'j (32)
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The number of successful cases is found by multiplying Equation 28
, by Equation 32 for each remaining phase.
n phase- 1
i-1 j=| _ + )2 F. + x Eq. 13Z)&
= , e x - (ZSIj (Z6)j
R j i=I j=1 (ss)
The total number o_f these cases is the sum of the cases for these
phases.
m m
R_A= Z RS_A = Z (33) (34)
j=z+l j j=z+l
R_A for the post landing phase, because a successful landing has been
3
accomplished, is considered to be mission success as well as crew safety,
and is added int_the MS total rather than the SA total. Since the post landing
phase is phase m, Equation 3Z reduces to approximately unity and the add/-
tionalnumber of mission successes is found directly fr, x Equation Z8 applied
to phase m.
ARMS = Eq. (?-.8)m (35)
Equation 34 is therefore modified by deleting the last phase from the
RtA total:
m-I
RA^= _ (33) (36)
j=z+l
Finally, the lower bound for crew safety is found by adding the lower
bound for mission success (Equations 7 and 35), the number of safe aborts
when not more than one failure per subsystem has occurred (Equation 2Z),
and all other cases of safe abort (Equations 31 and 36).
= RMS + + R A + R&
RCSlower lower RSAIower SAlower lower (37)
The overall crew safety reliability is found in the same manner as
mission success reliability.
=l -x/fly" RCS)upperx (lRCS Rcs) lower (38)
-Z1 -
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To determine the reliability of each phase, the upper and lower bounds
are determined and suitably combined as shown on page 8 and by Equation 38.
The appropriat_ equations are referenced below although detailed derivations
are not presented.
The mission success upper bound for a phase is simply e'_Fi for that
phase as indicated in the discussion, on pages 2 and 3. The mission success
lower bound is found by dividing the probability of getting through the phase,
(Equation Z6, j=l through phase), by the probability of getting to the phase,
(Equation 26, j=l through phase -1).
The crew safety upper bound index is found by subtracting failure cases
from unity. The probability of catastrophic failure is obtained directly from
Equation 25. The probability of abort failure is found by summing the
probabilities of safe aborts in a phase (summation of Equation 15 for all
subsystems in the phase) and subtracting this sum from the abort attempts.
The attempts are found by summing the products of Equations 10, 11, and 12
for all subsystems in the phase. The crew safety numeric obtained in this
manner is an index rather than an exact calculation because the number of
failures relates to the particular mission rather than to an independent phase.
f ..
The crew safety lower bound is found in the same manner. The prob- _._,_
abilities of catastrophic failure, abort failure with zero or one mission
failure, and other abort failures are summed, and this sum is subtracted
from unity. The probability of catastrophic failure is again obtained directly
from Equation 25. The probability of abort failure with zero or one mission
failure is the difference between the abort attempts and abort successes---
Equation 27 minus the summation of Equation Zl for all subsystems in the
phase. Finally', the probability of other abort failures is found by subtracting
F.luation 30 from Equation Z8, or Equation 33 from Equation 28, as applicable.
SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY
Subsystem reliabilities are found in a manner parallel to that used for
phase reliabilities. The mission success upper bound for a subsystem is
e-EFj for that subsystem. The mission success lower bound is obtained from
Equation 6.
The crew safety upper bound index for a subsystem is somewhat more
complex. While the probability of cat_strophic failure attributed to a
subsystem is found simply by summing Equation Z4 for all phases, the abort
failures charged to the subsystem must be further divided into aborts caused
,
i.
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by the subsystem being considered and aborts caused by other subsystems.
When the abort is caused by tile same subsystem which later causes crew
loss, the probability of loss is the product of F.quations 10, 11, 12, 13
modified to include half the abort, and (one - Equation 14). When the abort is
caused by another subsystem, the probability is the product of Equation 10,
Equation 11 modified so that n represents the subsystem causing the abort,
Equation 12 also so modified, Equation 13 modified to account for the system
which caused the abort and for half the abort time, and (on9 - Equation 14
modified). And, if the abort is caused by failure of the SPS, suitable changes
are made when applicable.
The crew safety lower-bound index is found in a _imilar manner.
The number of abort failures with zero or one failure in the mission is
determined by using Equations 17, 18, 19 and (one - Equation 20), appropri-
atelymodified. Because there is no accu.rate method of determining how
manyofthe other abort losses are caused by each subsystem, a simple
proportion is used. It is assumed that the percent of these losses per
subsystem is the same as the percent of the other abort losses, and the
probabilities are computed accordingly.
- )-3 -
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APPENDIX I. INPUT DATA REQUIREMENTS
The mathematical models which were developed are an optimum
compromise between the amount of effort that would be necessary to provide
very accurate predictions and the degree of error and approximation that
could be accepted without significantly affecting the prediction. Fortunately,
the prediction methods presented herein provide satisfactory prediction
accuracy without necessitating undue effort on the part of the analysts. The
few approximations required from the analysts are such that they will not
affect the overall results,
The following inputs, on a phase,by-phase ba._;is, are required for
each subsystem:
1. The sum of the failure probabilities of all series elements in MC:
_QkMc (series) where QkM C = kkM C x t x K factor (environmental)
x k factor (contingency)
2. The sum of the failure probabilities of those series elements
which are not catastrophic--i.e., series m MC but not series in
abort: _5Q"
kMC
3. The sum of the failure probabilities of the non-series elements in
MC (dual redundancy o'nly): _ MC . If Rk MC is greater than
MC
0. 999, it can be neglected.
4. The sum of the failure probabilities of al_._1elements considered in
MC: ZQ k MC (total)
5. The sum of the failure probabilities of the series elements in
abort: _QksA (series)
6. The sum of the failure probabilities of the non-series elements
(QksA). If Rks A is greaterin abort (dual redundancy only): _ Rl_ S
than 0.999, it can be neglected.
-85-
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7. Th_ stain of the failure probabilities of all elements e_,, side, ecl b,
abort: _Qk SA (total)
NOTE: In a_ abort resulting from failure of the SF_, the abort
corffigurations of other subsystems may be affcc*.ed. When thi_
occurs, sums 5, 6, and 7 will be changed. New auras, b_ 6_
and 7#, are required in addition to 5, 6, and 7,
8. The sum of the averaK__failure probability of additional elements
which become series in abort due to one non-catastrophic series
failure in the mission: X;AQksA (series)' This is found by
determining the average number of additional series elements and
multiplying by the average probability of failure in the abort.
% :
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APP,U, NDIX I[. NAA PRO(;RAM DIESCRIp'I'ION
l, dontification
_. i|l i
a, Program £or the Roliabilit¥ Evaluation of Apollo Mission - REAM-
b. Pro_amzr -F. J. Mosl._ (?/66)
o. _pace and In/orzmtion Syste_ Divlelon (NAA)
2, _Doee
REAMis designed to genor&%e &n Upper 8rid Lower Rolin_ili% 7 Doun4 for
Apollo Mission 8usoees 8rid Crow Safety. These two limits 8_e co_ined
RMS c_loulations into a_ ap]a_)ximLtely tz_e valus. F_LI_t'o Wo-
diotione and aooesomm_te t_e o61oulated on • =Lesion phue, suboTstem
buis.
_. RUtri_ons
a. REAMis written in FGRTRANIV _o_" use in t_e _LASYS _7stem.
b. No tapo8 L_O required,
o. Kud=nmof 25 subJ=Fste==8_t Jl0p_oes &re t_low_.
4. Me_ho_
a. Upper_oundCue
M_nsLon8uooessis de_ed bF:
_s- =p r_, (z)
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_PI_e J
n is the _or of I_D_tlI
a Is t_o _ of phues
l_obsb/lit7 of sat, abort L_oma_ Phaeo J oared _L___Lan7
euboT_es i /o reined bY tl_ee faetoro and lm IKven b7
Fj, -½
"A" "B"
C2)
ap Qm,_ • exp - _Qm,k
I1_11
FaVor "A" is the .probabilAty of getting to • phase"
F&_or "B" is the ,,probabilAt7 of noa-eatutrophAe _ail_e,'
Faoto_. 'C" :_; tho .probab:Ll£ty of suoeessf_ abort',
vlwro F_,i is the p_b_L_ty of tail_'e in mission of eu_-
e_etem i in Phue
F_ i is the l_e_A_t7 of aoa-ea1_rol_e faA1_e in
uteiloa of mubr_re_enti a l_aae
Oj_i IS tho ]wobllb:l_Lt7 Of f_Are in g_ Of eube:rstea
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AO_j,i io the add_Ltion_ _ort t_tlu_e Wobabi_t¥ of m_b..
syatm I wl_oh f_ dnr_n_ m_u_on in Pt_e J
r n im *.ha tot_l nunbor ot nbaFstems
n io tho ph_o :1_ quostion
k J.o the sub|_tam In question
Tho _ t_t_o Wo_b_Ltiee ((:;_,t) of v_io,_ sube:_oem ire
nodit_ed b:r t_e tLLluro in the moLon of _o 8P8 (Sm'rlN l_op_ion
S_s_teu). _a nod_tion oomn5 in Faotor "0" t_.tho rep_oeue_
ot O_,:Lb:r • XtWtol_ (;G_,t tO;" emil &ftoot, ed 8_arTart;em:Lfib gdlown
bolow
i-i
!
ii whore (Xln,_ _s t_s md_l_4e_ _bo_ _t.%,re l_ob_b_t:v ot 8_-
_u_om _ duo _o s 8PS f_tlure _n phase a
c,ok
"A" "D "
FseS_ "A" _e the ,,probabilit7 of i_ting to a phase"
Factor "D" le the "lrOl_ilAt7 of s eubrTsten@atastrop_Leal_ faA]lng
hair v_y U_rousha phase
where F_L _e the "prob_414t¥ of £-41u_e _n udee£on of sub- ._.
_tm i in Pl_e J"
F_ _e t_a ,,l_Ob_LLtt7 of non-oat_rCrop_o fzt_ur, _n
zLsolon of s_s',j'a'_mi _ PIu_o J"
n Ls the to_ nu_er of aubrT_em
n :La_e phaseia qu_t_on
k :Ls tho sub|ys_ Ln queet:Lon
Tho mmber of abo:_ fs_._ree oaused _ the _me subsystem.that f_ed
_n zlJalon Ls ot_ou_ted A_r_: --
L ,_-0.
"X" "S" (Aa)
ll_ll
- 30 -
SID 66-744
00000001-TSE03
A speoial cue o@ours whm_ the 8PS (Serviee Propulsion 5ubr_rtm_) fails
I_i ie bsoked up _ the L_ (Lunc h@ursion Module). The n_bar of
abort failures then become
J_-1 i-n
AFSSm,k = - _ _, exp " { ,i " Fa,k
J'l .....
(Ab)
"A" "B"
s .Eli
I_ Factor "A" is the probability of getting to a phase
Factor "B" Is the p_obability of non-_tamtrophio f____lu_.e+ aotor E i t e ro a ility Of abort failure
_r
!i wh_k'ee Fj,i ia t,he probabilit_ of failure in minion of eub-
_ta i in Ptsaamo,1
F_, i iS the prQb_bility of non-oatutroph_o ta_._ure in
milsion of o_b|To_a i in Phl41l ,_
01, t ie the probabilit7 of tatlu_ in abo_t of eub|yeteB
i in R.wt d
' AO_,i iS the add_tioMl abort fad.luro probab_l£tT of sub-
mt_ i wt_toh fa_ai durin_ m_,oion in Phue
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OOj,i Is tho m_/tfied abort _LI_ peob_JAtty of sub-
mystm i due to SPS failure in Ph_o J
n i8 tho total _nbqw of |ub_telu
I :Ls the ph_e in qu_t£on
k is the subsystem in quution
- 3Z -
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00000001-TSE05
i" ½ _,i • F_, - ._ - Fm,_ • r_,_ (_o)L-X _,-.),
YAO_ "A" :L8tho ][:l_ba_L_7 of jOtt,_Zl__,o• phildJqJ
Faotor "F" is the prol_t7 o_ no t_e8 of aL_ oth_ m_aJFsteuJ
- 33-
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Oj+i te the ]lrobabt:Lit¥ of f_e in aboz_of 8ub_em
I in l_lmee_
L_s _ ie the addit,ionlX t_oz_ fa:LX_l_ell_bab:l.Xit7 of nub-
Ilylf.lll :1.wl_l._ fl._ld :1.:1m;l.lll:l.o__ l_lllO ,1
OO_i,i is the addAtiozil aboPt f&iXu_ l_Obabi]£ty ot su]_
_an i du_ to SPSf_ 4_ PhMe
n is the tote_ n_nbor of eube_teua
m 40 the phase in queet£on
k is the euboFetenin quNt:l.on
r is _e SPS eubrTotea
b. Lmmr_und__
Theminion eontim_atlon_robabi_tt¥ le givenbF ++,
:2
"cPa,n" '_'<- ' _,n + _,n (6) i_
. vhere F_,i is the peobabilAtFef fai_ in n_mlea fe_all
eleneatef e_e_eteni in _haee
_,i le _e p_ebabl]AtFef _aIAu_ein a_ fe_ am,ee_Aes
elenm_eef 8u_en i in Phaee
s Ast_ephaee_a_ i
n _ tl_ e_o]m_ 4,, qum_ion i
- 34 - i
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The prob&b_tty of gott£ng thro_lh • ph_o from phaoo one :to _wen bD
where F_£ £e the probabilLty of leA:lure £n mLenion :or all
elemente of oubeyetemi in PlMMIe
I_L£ £s the probab£lit]V of .ea£1ure in-_eeton for non-eer£ee
elemnte of subsystem i in Phase J
m is the ldume in question
n is the _ inumb_ of nubr/otems _ :
The rel_b_:Lty of a phase m is given by the quot:L_t (froa Equation 7)
ROPI_ = l_Tm Ce)
Note that ROPH_." l_Tx
The probab:Lllty of ilett:l_l _ we_ through a phaee m, _ phaee i :Le
obt&tned bT
- 35 -
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_m F_,4 4e the p_obabilAt¥ ot faAAure in _Lnion for all
eleusis of subsystem i in phase
FJmi is the p_obabilAtF of feAluro in mt|JAon _or non-oories
elemontJ ot 8ubJ_ntem 4 in Fhase
a Is the phasein question
n ig the Lot_ number of eubsylltmm
The numberof abol_eoaueedby j_e_mten i in phase J £8 given by
p=l ,_, +_Fm, i+ J, +_Fm, " a,
,, !!
+ ;3, + Fro,,
(io)
i.
where FiA____is the _obabilAty of faille in aiNLon for a_
elene_s of eubsFeteu i in phase _
_,i i8 th_ probability of faAlure in m_eelon _or non-eerie8
elementsof 8ubs_an i in phase
F_,i ii the probabilAtyot non-e_taatrop_Lefa_AuPein
niseioa of subm_stm i in phase
n in the phase in q_estioa
n ie the eubeyeten in queetion
- 36 -
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The pretty of safe abort is deteruaned from
i,,.,, +_. _ 1+_,k"2_,,.k
Li-1\ , /J ..
PSam'k" ..... (]'+ _,k) • (11-)
A speela_ ease oeeturs when the 8PS fails, The abort fsAl_e j_ob&bil-
4ties of sac other subsFstem are ec_t_ied. This mditieation is
slwun in the f_ equatien where _ and _ terns replaces 0 and
tins it apt_ble.
[-I- "[-{.I][1
l"s_%"k" kl1 +_',k ...... ¢_b)
where 0_, i is the _babJJ_ty of _s£_ure in &bort for all
el_s_ts of subs.wt_ i in phase _
0_, i iS the prob&bilAt_ of £a:lAure in &bert for sA_ aon-eeriee
el_sof subsTsta i in phue
_,i is thea_Atieaal abortfailureprebab_AA_of sub-.
s_s_eui _ale__aIAe_d_ nlssleala phase
oe
001,i and_Li aretheundAt_e_abortfal.t_..e;mbabilitle,o_s_-
s_s_eai due_e SPS _a_e la phase
n is _he to_a_ nunber of subs_stm
- 37 -
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n tJ the pl_e _n qu_t_on
k II the 8ubJ_rtem in ctuwtlon
whore n _s the ph_e _n queJt_on
k 4e the suborn in _omt_
The oont_b_on of n_l_o t_L_e8 of L3_ other 8ubar78tem %o
f&_t7 _n the abo_ node is Ctven
_ L_.,'_.......
- 38-
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The n_bor of _or_ L'id.luz,eo _ulmd b7 tho _am muboyotlm that fLtlod
_,nzLmo:Lonim dotarminod fr_
m
"0" "H" (_1
E E+
A epeolal ouo ooourl wh,n the SPS taile th, abort failuro
prob&biliti_ of some oth_ eu_e_tm aro m_t_ed. This modifioation
is illustratod in the fo13._ equation
I-I-+
- :39-
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Faetc_ "G" L8 the jlrobadD_Lty of |ott_ _ throlldKh& ph_o
(v_a_tion9)
F_oz" nil" LS the probab_J_Ltytl_t one half tho nnalt:Lplofat_uros
be tara1 to the arev (fromEquAtLon13)
uhelw Oj,:L _al tho lrObab:Llity of fg_Lluro :Ln8bol-t for all
ele_nt8 of subrTstm _ _n phue J
Oj_4 _s the lrObab4_4t¥ of f_Llure in abort for al_ non-eerie8
eleum_8 of 8ubeystam t in phase J
AGIj£ :l.s the adKtt:Lon_ abort fa:l£uro probab:L_LtF ot sub-
rTstea i whloh fslled d_wlnS :LssJ.on in phsse J
F_,_ is the probabJ._ty oF fa_uro _n x_ee'_n for non-ser_.os
olaumt8 of subs_ten i _n phase
F' _ the probabJ_tt¥ of non-_tastropl_e fa_ure :In
_,i
:Lsslon of s_bs_sten t 1.,:phase
(_F_,:I. are the nod:Lf:Lodabort _a£_ul'o prob&b:i_l.t:l.e8 o_ sub-
r78ten L duo to a SPSt_l_re _n ph_e
Tho number of &bort fa:L_tl_o8 o_u_od by • 8ubsFuten that d_d not oauoe
tho _bort _s g_en by
- 40 -
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' III111
llu,ol_an,b:l,),,:l.t,:LNot oamoor,box' arub_wm a,x,omod.,'L,f"A.ed_ elw_wnbL%ow.
_n_
"O" "II" "
imu
, l'n_mk 1_t
L _ J
Fs •
- ap - OOl,,k (_i_,
- 41 -
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Li" Pmmor.O" 4J _e lWOtmbLl_tTot _tXnl _ t_oulh s pl_,
*+, (r,q tion9)
k_
+ Psoto_"g" Lo the proof7 t_t one_ of tho mZtLpZ, fad_.uz,oe
i _ be fat_ to the o:w (PPanr_mt_on13)
vhero G_,_ ie the probmbL_Lt7of tatl_e in ebo_ tot o_
olmento of subsFoten i Ln pl_e
__O_Ji is the Wob_:tlit;y of fSil_e in ebol_ to: ell non-
'_ eo_ee e]_nmto ot sub878_ L _ ph_e
_i _,:1, :t,aJ_ au:ldAt_Lona,,tabort .-"m_Ll_ol='otMd:t:L3,At7_or.arab-
I: rTmteu_ wl_oh tatlal: e=inj n_s_on _ ]phue
_,_ is the peo__r of f_e Ln ndj,_n fo_ nonoN_om
i! elenc_J ot _es _ _ pl_8o
_ Fj,_ is tho Wo_tF ot non-_r_opl_o _o in
t! -durra of sulm_stes_ _n plme _
t s_'l'Oels i cLue_o I SP8 L+aLlu.'o _ phalo ,I
i _heaW?rezlm_elw_evtl_eet thetail.reweba_t:r iso_od b7
_ the eqw_re_t oL'_ _ ot t_e _ u_ 3mmr_.uo8 of
_,. the l_O_tF of f_.3_ro
(s;. ].) 61
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i I
Card HO. 1 Coamont,a
Prouam dat,a doeoz.ipt,_'_ _ tkto oa_ _ W_t_ at the top of e_oh
output pa_e. Come.o, lS'Oip'm tLt).u, teat blook number, date, _o.
ocouw ool_no 1 - 80. C_ the oo_ent on the oard
_ oor_m' the ooaent on *,he output page.
Cm_ILNo. 2 D&t_ S:lJso
O.O.
_j - 2_ xu_ subm_t_
of aAJuated) 25
Card Oroup No. 3 Sube_r_emNa_m
Sub_em ham abl_ev_Lons are writtenone on uoh oarA in
oolmunai - 12. There _mLld be a eubr_rb_ name oa.-d for eaoh Sub-
system and should be queued,in '_,.e e&mooz_en"U the in]rot data.
No. 4 Control
0.4.
1 - 80 Y_ oont_Ln _ 9'a
Thin mu_ separate8 the 8_ayotm namm oaz_ from the upper bound
infer data oards.
;2
Card Oroup No. 5 UpperBound Data
0.0."
1 - 12 Mieaion Failure P_ob_b2_t)"
f! 13 - 2_ Abort FalSe Pr_bahtlAty
2_ - :_0 1CLe_LonFailure ProbabilLt7 (non-o_tUt_opl_e)
- 43 -
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*'* _i - 36 Iddltions_Abort Fsl_uroPro_sbLl_t7
37 - _ _i_ Abert FslluroPro_Lty (SPSF_Llure)
73 SPS Bulmp Xnat_tor
1 tot RCS
2tor L_q
77 - 80 subs stmNuabm. adustt)
There s_uld be a eard for eaeh sub.tin in eaeh phue. The cards
m_ be in an_ erder.
Card No. 6 _a_el
OeO.
i - 80 l_t eontatn all 9' eL
Thie eard eeparatee the upper bound data _rom the lower bound data.
Card Group No. 7 _ Bound Data
0,0,
I - 8 Mission Failure 1_obabilit T All Elemmlt8
9 - 16 Mission FailureProbab_lAtF All Non-SerlesEleaents
17 - _ Abort FailurePrebe_IAA_7All E1e_ats
25 - 32 Abort Fail_z'ePrObebilAtTAll Non-Ser_.esElo_tm
33 - AO Miuion Failure Prebabilit_ Non-Catutrophio
63.- _8 KoUAL_e4Aboz_ l_Li3.urel_ebabilAtT
/_9- 56 ModifiedAbort Fa_ Prebabilit7
57 - 66 AcidLY/muGAbort _adAm.ePrebabLIAt7
7_3 SPS _emp _d_ostor
1 for a_
_ fer L_
- 44 -
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00000001-TSF05
77 - eo _mss _hmb_.(rS._t sd_..,4)
There shou_ be • osrd for ,sob subsTst_a in ssch phue. The _rd
_s_ be in s_ ordsr.
Csrd Ho,...B... Control
_Le earL t_toe tho data read,
6, ADzxmd.taos
Zpp_x I - De(ticSetup
AppendixlI ...ScrupleData
AR_ XIX - SI_l_ OU%_
- 45 -
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